The Big 2020 Election Steal And The Persons Who May Have Pulled It Off – Part 2

January 8, 2022

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In part II of this series, we examine the second individual who has admittedly hacked election systems and machinery – J Alex Halderman. We need only to begin with his Wiki page:

J. Alex Halderman (born c. January 1981) is professor of Computer Science and Engineering at the University of Michigan, where he is also director of the Center for Computer Security & Society. Halderman’s research focuses on computer security and privacy, with an emphasis on problems that broadly impact society and public policy.

Education

Halderman was awarded the A.B. summa cum laude in June 2003, the M.A. in June 2005, and the Ph.D. in June 2009, all in Computer Science from Princeton University

Academic career

As a student at Princeton, Halderman played a significant role exposing flaws in Digital Rights Management software used on compact discs. In 2004, he discovered that a DRM system called MediaMax CD-3 could be bypassed simply by holding down the shift key while inserting a CD. The company behind the system briefly threatened him with a $10 million lawsuit, landing him on the front page of USA Today. Later, in 2005, he helped show that a DRM system called Extended Copy Protection functioned identically to a rootkit and weakened the security of computers in which audio CDs were played. The ensuing Sony BMG copy protection rootkit scandal led to the recall of millions of CDs, class action lawsuits, and enforcement action by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.

In 2008, Halderman led the team that discovered the cold boot attack against disk encryption, which allows an attacker with physical access to a computer device to extract encryption keys or other secrets from its memory. The technique, which was initially effective against nearly every full-disk encryption product on the market, exploits DRAM data remanence to retrieve memory contents even after the device has been briefly powered off. One version of the technique involves cooling DRAM modules with freeze spray to slow data decay, then removing them from the computer and reading them in an external device. It has become an important part of computer forensics practice and has also inspired a wide variety of defensive research, such as leakage-resilient cryptography and hardware implementations of encrypted RAM. For their work developing the attack, Halderman and his coauthors received the Pawnee Award for Most Innovative Research and the Best Student Paper Award from the USENIX Security Symposium.

At the University of Michigan, Halderman and coauthors performed some of the first comprehensive studies of Internet censorship in China and in Iran, and of underground “street networks‘ ‘ in Cuba. In 2009, he led a team that uncovered security problems and copyright infringement in client-side censorship software mandated by the Chinese government. The findings helped catalyze popular protest against the program, leading China to reverse its policy requiring its installation on new PCs. In 2011, Halderman and his students invented Telex, a new approach to circumventing Internet censorship, partially by placing anti censorship technology into core network infrastructure outside the censoring country. With support from the United States Department of State, which called the technique a “generational jump forward” in censorship resistance, Halderman led a multi-institutional collaboration that further developed the technology and deployed it at ISP-scale under the name Refraction Networking. In 2015, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power brought him to New York to demonstrate the technology at a meeting alongside the General Assembly.

In 2012, Halderman and coauthors discovered serious flaws in random number generators that weakened the public-key cryptography used for HTTPS and SSH servers in millions of Internet of things devices. They disclosed vulnerabilities to 60 device manufacturers and spurred changes to the Linux kernel. Their work received the Best Paper Award at the USENIX Security Symposium and was named one of the notable computing articles of the year by ACM Computing Reviews. Halderman played a significant role in fixing several major vulnerabilities in the TLS protocol. He was a co-discoverer of the Logjam and DROWN attacks, and conducted the first impact assessment of the FREAK attack. The three flaws compromised the security of tens of millions of HTTPS websites and resulted in changes to HTTPS server software, web browsers, and the TLS protocol. Since they worked by exploiting remnants of ways in which older versions of the protocol had been deliberately weakened due to 1990s-era restrictions on the export of cryptography from the United States, they carried lessons for the ongoing public policy debate about cryptographic back doors for law enforcement.

Halderman’s Logjam work also provided a plausible explanation for a major question raised by the Edward Snowden revelations: how the National Security Agency could be decoding large volumes of encrypted network traffic. By extrapolating their results to the resources of a major government, the researchers concluded that nation-state attackers could plausibly break 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key exchange using a purpose-built supercomputer. For a cost on the order of a hundred million dollars, an intelligence agency could break the cryptography used by about two-thirds of all virtual private networks. Snowden publicly responded that he shared the researchers’ suspicions and blamed the U.S. government for failing to close a vulnerability that left so many people at risk. The work received the 2015 Pwnie Award for Most Innovative Research and was named Best Paper at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.

In 2013, Halderman and his graduate students created ZMap, a free and open-source security scanning tool designed for information security research.^[19] By making efficient use of network bandwidth, ZMap can scan the Internet’s entire IPv4 address space in under an hour, allowing researchers to quantify vulnerable systems, track the adoption of security patches, and even measure the impact of natural disasters that disrupt Internet access. Halderman and collaborators used it to track the OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability and raised the global rate of patching by 50% by warning the operators of unpatched web servers. Their work won the Best Paper award at the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. In partnership with Google, Halderman’s research group used ZMap to study the security of email delivery, highlighting seven countries where more than 20% of inbound Gmail messages arrived unencrypted due to network attackers. To mitigate the problem, Gmail added an indicator to let users know when they receive a message that wasn’t delivered using encryption, resulting in a 25% increase in inbound messages sent over an encrypted connection. Halderman and his collaborators were recognized with the 2015 IRTF Applied Networking Research Prize.

In order to accelerate the adoption of encryption by web servers, Halderman in 2012 partnered with Mozilla and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to found the Let’s Encrypt HTTPS certificate authority. Let’s Encrypt provides HTTPS certificates at no cost through an automated protocol, significantly lowering the complexity of setting up and maintaining TLS encryption. Since its launch in 2016, Let’s Encrypt has grown to protecting more than 150 million web sites. Halderman and his students laid the foundation for the IETF-standard protocol that clients use to interface with the CA, the Automated Certificate Management Environment. He sits on the board of directors of the Internet Security Research Group, the non-profit that operates Let’s Encrypt. He is also a co-founder and chief scientist of Censys, a network security company that he says aims to “change the way security works by making it more quantitative, more precise, and more accurate.”

In 2015, Halderman was part of a team of proponents that included, Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Nadia Heninger, and Andrea Matyshyn who successfully proposed a security research exemption to Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

Halderman was awarded a Sloan Research Fellowship in 2015 by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and in 2019 he was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He was profiled in the November 2016 issue of Playboy.

All one can say is “WOW!” Mr. Halderman is very well papered and heavily rooted in voting cybersecurity at its base. For many years leading up to the 2020 election Halderman was loud and vocal about the vulnerability of the electronic voting systems in America. He has performed many escapades that are legendary in the industry.

Once in 2010, Halderman hacked a mockup voting system in Washington, D.C. from his lab at the University of Michigan… in 36 hours. Halderman has written viruses that can be injected at a single point and then replicated throughout the entire voting system. He has effortlessly changed the outcome of numerous student voting activities.

In Sept. of 2021, Halderman openly makes a declaration that the Dominion Voting System Machines used in the 2020 Georgia Election were in fact infected with malware which could be used to exploit the system as a whole and flip votes. A PDF file of that whole court document filed by Halderman can be viewed at:

https://cdn.michaeljlindell.com/downloads/fix2020first/exibits/Tab%2005%20092121%20Halderman%20Decl..pdf

With the above statement in mind, how can any reasonable person not question why did U.S. District Court Judge Amy Totenberg seal the report that would at least bolster and substantiate Mike Lindell’s and Matt DePerno’s claims that Dominion Voting Systems were hacked?

Judge Totenberg claimed she wanted to, “shield the public from bad faith efforts to undermine the 2020 election.” Totenberg is the sister of NPR’s Nina Totenberg and nominated to the U.S. district court in Atlanta by former President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in November 2011. She donated $2,750 to Obama.

Totenberg ruled that as many as 27,000 ballots get a second look after having been rejected because voters lacked registration or identification proof at the polls, giving Democrat Stacey Abrams hope of finding the additional votes she needs for a come-from-behind win or to force a runoff election in the governor’s race.

HOWEVER, in this case The Georgia Obama Judge sealed the case revealing ballot devices as hacked and thus vulnerable to hacking after expert testimony revealed what Mike Lindell’s experts have been saying all along. The mainstream dismissed the idea the voting machines were corrupted even though they were exposing the voting machines vulnerabilities ad nauseam just before the election.

A Michigan computer science professor who has testified multiple times to Congress about U.S. election security, J. Alex Halderman told a judge that malware found on Georgia’s Dominion causes specific, highly exploitable vulnerabilities that allow attackers to change votes without detection.

Ironically, the plaintiff’s expert witness in Antrim County Circuit against Matt DePerno was analyzed by J. Alex Halderman. Just months ago, Dominion was accused of being hacked by Matt DePerno’s team. Now that Halderman has done a 180, the expert witness has been dismissed by the mainstream media, and his findings are sealed!

https://theedtemple.blogspot.com/2021/08/expert-used-to-debunk-dominion-voting.html

These most recent events certainly lean toward the notion that Mr. Halderman was NOT involved in The Big Steal, we can safely say that his work in American voting cybersecurity WAS undoubtedly. Quoting Halderman:

“After the chaos of the 2000 election, we were promised a modern and dependable way to vote. I’m here to tell you that the electronic voting machines Americans got to solve the problem of voting integrity. They turned out to be an awful idea,” said Halderman. “That’s because people like me can hack them, all too easily. I’m a computer scientist who has hacked a lot of electronic voting machines. I even turned one machine into a video game. Imagine what the Russians and North Koreans can do.”

https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2020/11/michigan_professor_demonstrates_how_easy_it_is_to_hack_voting_machines_in_2018_new_york_times_video.html

The major differences between Halderman and Jake Braun are 1. One got appointed to the White House after the election 2. The other has made an official statement in court punishable by perjury charges – THAT DOMINION MACHINES WERE HACKED DURING THE 2020 ELECTIONS.

With the knowledge he possesses, why is Halderman not screaming from the rafters? Was he paid off? Threatened? He is either guilty by design, association, or omission. He KNOWS the election was hacked and is doing nothing – guilty.

In part III of this series, we will explore an organization you might want to employ if you wanted to steal an election: Cambridge Global Advisors. CGA is, if anything ever were, a perfect expression of the Deep State. I’ll say it, CGA is an arm of the Deep State. CGA… founded by a globalist republican who also happened to be vice chairman of Deutsche Bank Asset Management and global co-head of private equity, and CEO of PIMCO’s largest equity arm, Columbus Circle Investors. Also as founders, two democrats with strong ties to the DNC and the Department of Homeland Security. It’s a perfect storm of globalist elites operating under the guise of a private company.